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U.S. data marketers argue that electronic commerce can
only flourish if allowed to develop without restraining
legislation. Privacy enthusiasts counter that the development
of e-commerce is presently hampered by public fear over the
uses of private data transferred through online transactions.
The United States and the European Union share a
commitment to the development of electronic commerce, but
have approached the problem of data protection very
differently. The EU has promulgated a comprehensive data
protection regulation, The European Union Directive on Data
Protection, while the United States prefers a market-driven
approach, combining legislation, regulation, and,
predominantly, self-regulation.
In this Comment, Paul Rose proposes a market solution-
the creation of a new privacy market, that satisfies the US
preference for an entirely industry-generated solution to the
problems of data transfers, yet also satisfies the demands of the
EU Directive on Data Protection
SJ.D. Candidate, UCLA School of Law, 2001; B.A., Brigham Young University, 1995.
Special thanks to Professor Richard Steinberg, who provided the seminal concept for this
comment. This comment received the 1999 Morris Greenspan Prize as UCLA School of
Law's best paper on the topic of international law.
445
446 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 445 (1999)
INTRODUCTION: A PRIMER ON U.S. AND EU POSITIONS ON DATA PROTECTION
IN INTERNET CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS ........................................... 446
I. THE PRIVACY PROBLEM AND THE ROLE OF THE PRIVACY
ESCROW ............................................................................................... 450
A. Privacy in Online Transactions ............................................. 451
1. Defining Privacy ...................................................... 451
2. Private Data Transfers ............................................. 453
3. The Data M arket ...................................................... 455
B. The Privacy Escrow .............................................................. 457
1. Real Property Escrows to Privacy Escrows ............. 458
2. Anonymizing Browsing and E-mail ........................ 459
3. Anonymizing Payment ............................................ 460
4. Securing Transactions .............................................. 462
5. A Model Privacy Escrow Transaction ..................... 463
II. THE PRIVACY ESCROW SOLUTION SATISFIES EUROPEAN UNION
PRIVACY DEMANDS ............................................................................. 465
A. The European Union Directive on Data Protection .............. 465
B. The Privacy Market Response ............................................... 467
III. THE PRIVACY ESCROW SYSTEM SATISFIES U.S. MARKET
PREFERENCES ...................................................................................... 469
A. Self-Regulation ...................................................................... 469
B. The Safe Harbor Principles ................................................... 471
C. The Privacy Market Solution ................................................. 473
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 475
"Because this technology knows no borders, it is far better for the
market to respond than for governments around the world to take
action."
--U.S. Commerce Secretary William M. Daley
INTRODUCTION: A PRIMER ON U.S. AND EU POSITIONS ON DATA
PROTECTION IN INTERNET CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS
In 1995, the European Union harmonized data protection standards
across its member states through the Directive on Data Protection
1
1 See Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
Oct. 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 (Nov. 23, 1995)
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(Directive). The Directive requires that all member states enact data
protection measures, 2 and also requires that non-EU countries
<http:lleuropa.eu.intleur-lex/en/lif/datl1995/en_395LOO46.html> [hereinafter Directive]. I use
the somewhat dehumanizing term "data subject" throughout this paper to describe individuals
engaging in online transactions. I find this EU and Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) term to be an appropriate descriptor because it focuses on the
proprietary relationship between a person and her data.
2 The OECD has outlined eight basic "privacy principles" to govern personal data
transfers:
1. Collection Limitation: there should be limits to the collection of personal
data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject; 2. Data Quality:
personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used,
and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete
and kept up-to-date; 3. Purpose Specification: the purposes for which personal
data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data
collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or
such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on
each occasion or change of purpose; 4. Use Limitation: personal data should
not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than
those specified in accordance with the "purpose specification" except: (a) with
the consent of the data subject; or (b) by the authority of law; 5. Security
Safeguards: personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguard
against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification
or disclosure of data; 6. Openness: there should be a general policy of openness
about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data.
Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of
personal data, the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual
residence of the data controller; 7. Individual participation: an individual
should have the right: (a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise,
confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him; (b)
to have communicated to him, data relating to him: within a reasonable time; at
a charge, if any, that is not excessive; in a reasonable manner; and, in a form
that is readily intelligible to him; (c) to be given reasons if a request made
under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such
denial; and, (d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is
successful to have the data erased, rectified, completed, or amended; 8.
Accountability: a data controller should be accountable for complying with
measures that give effect to the principles stated above.
OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data (1980); see also OECD, Working Party on Information Security and Privacy, Inventory
of Instruments and Mechanisms Contributing to the Implementation and Enforcement of the
OECD Privacy Guidelines on Global Networks (DSTIIICCP/REG(98)12/FINAL) 10-I
(1999) [hereinafter OECD Inventory]. The Federal Trade Commission has distilled these
principles into four pairs of principles: Notice/Awareness, Choice/Consent,
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receiving personal data3 transfers from EU countries provide an
"adequate" level of privacy protection for European personal data.
Failure to provide adequate protection will result in member states
taking "the measures necessary to prevent any transfer of data of the
same type to the third country in question," 4 including cutting off data
flows to "data protection outlaw nations."
5
The European Union and the United States both have deep
commitments to the development of electronic commerce, and are
working to insure an uninterrupted flow of information. However, the
EU and U.S. approaches to data protection differ significantly. While
the European Union favors comprehensive data protection regulations,
the United States prefers a "sectoral" approach, combining legislation,
regulation, and, predominantly, self-regulation,6 on the premise that
"private efforts of industry working in cooperation with consumer
groups are preferable to governmental regulation." 7 In response to the
requirements of the EU Directive, the EU and U.S. (through the efforts
of the Department of Commerce and U.S. businesses) are developing
the "International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles," 8 a basic self-
Access/Participation, and Security/Integrity. See FEDERAL TRADE COmm'N, PRIVACY ONLINE:
A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7-11 (1998) [hereinafter PRIVACY ONLrNE].
3 "'Personal data' are the data relating to any identified or identifiable individual (the 'data
subject'). Individuals are identifiable not only by means of their name but also by their
pictures, by their telephone number, by some special identification number etc." European
Union DG XV, Data Protection: Background Information (visited Nov. I1, 1999)
<http://europa.eu.int/commdgl5/en/media/dataprotlbackinfo/info.htm>.
4 Directive, art. 25.4, supra note 1.
5 Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and the Restrictions on International
Data Flows, 80 IOwA L. REv. 471, 484 (1995).
6 The U.S. also relies on a very few sector-specific statutes, such as the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.C. § 1681 (Supp. 3), and the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1994).
7 William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce
(visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.iitf.nistgov/eleccommecomm.htm> [hereinafter
Framework].
8 The term "Safe Harbor" does not refer to a safe harbor for European citizens, but a safe
harbor for companies who comply with the principles, and are thus presumed to provide
"adequate" protection for personal data transfers. See Dep't of Commerce, International Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles (visited Sept. 27, 1999)
<http:/Iwww.ita.doc.gov/ecomlshprin.html> (draft of Apr. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Safe Harbor
Principles].
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regulatory framework for U.S. businesses seeking to comply with the
Directive.
The current U.S. self-regulation model has yet to resolve many of
the domestic privacy concerns that worry Internet users,9 and some
Europeans have expressed skepticism that the Safe Harbor Principles
will provide adequate protection for trans-border data flows. This
skepticism stems from concerns over the advantages U.S. businesses
enjoy over consumers under the current scheme. Online businesses
have access to powerful information collection technologies that allow
them to create valuable personal information profiles--the hot
commodity in a burgeoning personal data market--for use in various
business operations from marketing to risk management. These
businesses (especially data marketing companies whose primary
business is to track and sell personal data, such as Engage
Technologies, Acxiom, Doubleclick and Clickstream) thus have a
strong incentive to preserve a deregulated forum where they can
maintain control over the lucrative personal information marketplace.
But, as Joel Reidenberg explains, "a marketplace can only function
efficiently if there is transparency; citizens must be able to identify the
collectors and users of their personal information. However, for
personal information, the natural tendency of the marketplace is to
obscure its treatment."10 Because many e-commerce businesses are
unwilling to deal transparently," and do not wish to give up
9 Forrester Technographics reports that two-thirds of online shoppers feel insecure about
exchanging personal information over the Internet, limiting the development of electronic
commerce. See Forrester Technographics Finds Online Consumers Fearful of Privacy
Violations, BusINEsS WIRE, Oct. 27, 1999. See also Privacy Exchange.org, 1998 Privacy
Concerns & Consumer Choice Survey, Executive Summary, P&AB Survey, PRIVACY & AM.
Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 1; <http://www.privacyexchange.orglisstsurveys/1298exec-
sum.html> (reporting that 82% of those surveyed believe that consumers have lost all control
over how companies collect and use personal data); AARP, AARP Members' Concerns About
Information Privacy (Dec. 1998) (reporting that 78% of respondents found existing legislative
measures to be inadequate to protect privacy).
10 Joel P, Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERK.
TECH. L.J. 771, 775 (1999).
1 As Jerry Kang notes, market solutions tend to ignore heavy transaction costs associated
with creating a transparent market. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1248 (1998).
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innovative, powerful marketing tools,12 consumers are invariably the
losers in the data market.' 3 Data subjects are typically required to
sacrifice valuable private data without compensation as a condition of
transacting online, and are not able to "buy back" their personal
information once it has been given up. Some scholars have suggested
that the market's failure necessitates a legislative response.
4
However, because of the deep U.S. commitment to self-regulation and
to the Safe Harbor Principles, comprehensive privacy legislation is
unlikely, and, as I argue, unnecessary. Although the data market has
failed consumers, privacy concerns can still be resolved through
market forces--through the creation of a privacy market.
In this paper I discuss the privacy market solution to data
protection, which would further U.S. market preferences, yet offer the
personal data protection required by the EU Directive. In Part I, I
outline the privacy market solution: the privacy escrow system. In
Part II, I discuss how this solution satisfies the European Union
Directive. In Part IH, I discuss how this solution addresses U.S.
concerns.
I. THE PRIVACY PROBLEM AND THE ROLE OF THE PRIVACY
ESCROW
The EU Directive on Data Protection covers all types of data
transfers, including transfers involving medical information, personal
information gathered through loan applications, employee information
12 Data collection is big business: in 1998, the gross annual revenue of companies selling
private data reached 1.5 billion. See In Re Trans Union, FTC Docket No. 9255, at 53 (July
31, 1998), available at <http:/www.fic.gov/os/1998/9808/d9255pub.id.pdf> (visited Mar. 28,
1998).
13 Private data, while having some value for the consumer, may have more value to the
business tracking the information. For example, I may not value the datum that I am a law
student, since the information is easily available. However, the information may be of some
value to the auto manufacturers, for example, who anticipate that after graduation I will find
employment and will want to find a way to spend the last few dollars available after student
loan payments.
14 See Kang, supra note 11; Reidenberg, supra note 10.
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gathered by human resources departments, and information obtained
through online transactions. Inevitably, businesses digitally file these
data, efficiently manipulating the information in order to create a
detailed personal "file" (a technique known as "profiling"). The
ability to easily manipulate sensitive data and transfer the data on to
third parties in third countries has focused attention on an increasingly
important international data transfer system: the Internet. Although
basic telephony and paper data transfers implicate important data
concerns, the Internet and other forms of digital information transfers
have become the most efficient and rapidly expanding means of
personal data transfer. Accordingly, I limit my focus in this paper to
Internet data transfers.
A. Privacy in Online Transactions
1. Defining Privacy
Privacy as a general right or value includes several related notions
or "facets."' 15 Among these we may include (1) information privacy
(concerning personal data such as credit or medical information); (2)
bodily privacy (concerning the protection of a person against invasive
physical contact); (3) privacy of communications (concerning
telephone, mail, email and other forms of communication); and (4)
territorial privacy (concerning the protection of domestic or other
types of "personal" space). I will primarily focus on information
privacy and privacy of communications, since these are the facets of
privacy typically implicated by the EU Directive and in Internet
activity. When I discuss "privacy" throughout the paper, I generally
refer to information privacy and communications privacy concerns.
Privacy defenders often label privacy as a property interest. This
15 See David Banisar & Simon Davies, Privacy and Human Rights: An International
Survey of Privacy Laws and Practice (visited Dec. 12, 1999)
<http:llwwv.gilc.org/privacysurvey/intro.html>. I do not presume that the definition offered
here perfectly or even thoroughly describes the nature and scope of the concept of privacy.
However, for the limited needs and scope of this paper, the definition should adequately frame
a common understanding of privacy.
452 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 445 (1999)
notion has intuitive appeal--my personal data belong to me, and I
should have sole decisional rights as to the disposition of my personal
data. Professor Jerry Kang notes that
[p]rivacy enthusiasts insist that the individual self-evidently owns
her personal information. Therefore, the information collector
should not be able to make use of that "property" without
permission. Unfortunately, what is self-evident for some is
question-begging for others. Information collectors retort that the
information was generated in a mutual interaction, in which the
individual and the information collector were equal participants.
Why then should the individual have preferred rights over what was
jointly produced?
16
While privacy enthusiasts and information collectors disagree on
whether post-transaction information remains the sole property of the
original owner, or that data subjects and data collectors co-own the
information, suppose we stipulate only that pre-transaction
information is solely possessed by the data subject. This assumption,
too, "could easily be defeated by the realities of modem transactional
life.' 17 Individuals asserting a property right over their personal
information would undoubtedly value the information differently.
Routine transactions, such as obtaining a loan, applying for credit, or
setting up telephone service would be inefficiently complicated as
individuals haggled with businesses over the value of commonly
transferred personal information, such as a social security number.
18
Because the property rights approach appears impractical, "anonymity
[the approach I forward in this comment] may be the only technique of
resistance to profiling (short of civil disobedience or outright
surrender) available to the average citizen."'
19
The creation of a property right over personal information is not
necessary to justify the creation of a privacy market. The commodity
16 Kang, supra note 11, at 1246.
17 A. Michael Froomkin, Regulation of Computing and Information Technology: Flood
Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed
Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 492 (1996).
18 See id
'9 Id. at 493.
A Market Response to the European Union Directive on Privacy
of the market that I describe in this comment is not personal
information, but privacy itself, achieved through anonymous
communications and transactions. 20 In some cases, individuals may be
able to bargain with their personal data.21 However, because of the
impracticality of valuing property rights on personal information,
efficient control of personal information is more likely achieved by
paying a premium on transactions to insure that personal data remain
private,22 than by engaging in wasteful bargaining over the value of
various personal data. The privacy market approach does not seek to
quantify the value of personal data, but the value of privacy.
2. Private Data Transfers
Having briefly described a definitional foundation for a discussion
of privacy and private information, I now move to a description of the
ways in which private information is transferred and collected in
online transactions and communications. My scope covers three
primary categories of cross-border personal data flows for which there
exists, or could exist, an adequate privacy market response. These
three categories of data flows reflect the range of increasingly
20 1 view anonymity as a means of insuring privacy, rather than as a synonym for privacy.
Privacy is achieved through personal data control; anonymity, or selective anonymity, allows
data subjects to maintain this control.
21 But see Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 775 (arguing that "privacy interests are central to
democratic governance and privacy has been hailed as a necessary condition for participatory
governance. In contrast, totalitarian governments prefer the surveillance state. Indeed, a
democratic government typically does not sell basic political rights" (citations omitted)). See
also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23-26, (1967). However, inasmuch as private
data is a property interest, the freedom to dispose of property conflicts with this notion. My
own concern is not that individuals would wish to sell private information, but that they are
able to sell the information in a well-functioning market, where they are able to command a
fair price for the information, or would be able to pay a fair price to insure anonymity.
2 Because the U.S. is unlikely to pass comprehensive privacy regulations, individuals will
have to pay to insure the security of their data, even if they do have a property interest in their
information. Under the current U.S. position, however, there is no protection of privacy as a
property interest-individuals are unable to take a data collector to court in order to have the
information remitted to the "owner." The U.S. does allow individuals a cause of action
against companies that make inappropriate use of the information.
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important online personal information transfers between EU member
states and U.S. companies.
The first type of data flow occurs as companies collect information
from an individual as she browses web sites. When an individual
visits servers through Internet browsing activity, the server typically
logs the URL23 of the resource from which the request was made, and
also logs the time of visit. The server may also set a "cookie," a file
that logs information the client offers during her visit. The server then
stores the cookie on the client's hard drive. The data collector server
then accesses the cookie when a client returns to the site, and the
cookie allows the server to personalize the information presented to
the client. Although cookies typically contain only small, isolated bits
of private information, companies sometimes agree to share
information gathered through cookies, producing a mosaic of valuable
personal information.
24
The second type of data flow occurs through email systems. When
email messages are sent they include a header, which identifies the
sender, and which may also identify the sender's operating system.
Anonymous re-mailers, which "re-mail" email messages through a
series of servers in order to disguise the identity of the sender, answer
this concern to the extent that the re-mailed messages are not
ultimately traceable to the sender.2 5 However, the abuse of re-mailers
has created new concerns, as clients use the services to send offensive
messages or mass mailings. Because of these abuses, some
anonymous re-mailing systems have been forced to cease operation.
26
2 The "Uniform Resource Locator," or the "address," such as <http://www.law.ucla.edu>.
24 For example, businesses may be able to determine what key word searches an individual
conducted, what sites the individual visited, how long they lingered at certain pages, and what
they purchased.
25 Some anonymous re-mailers, such as the Hotmail Re-mailer, Anonymizer, and the
Freedom Re-mailer, allow clients to send email through web pages, allowing complete
anonymity. Other re-mailers send email through a series of servers, readdressing the message
and resending several times before sending it to the ultimate, intended recipient. Examples of
this type of re-mailer are Replay and Nymserver.
26 The integrity of privacy escrows is essential to the viability of the privacy market, just as
the integrity of bankers is essential to a fair and legal banking system. The use of
anonymizing technologies must be balanced with law enforcement interests, and privacy
escrows must insure that the escrow system is not used for illegal activities. See infra Part
II.B.
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Third, individuals reveal personal information when they purchase
goods or services over the Internet. Electronic commerce transactions
usually require credit card payments, which necessitate the disclosure
of some personal information. For example, a credit card purchase
typically requires a client to give his name and his billing address, and
sometimes a telephone number and email address. Ideally, consumers
should have the option of remaining as anonymous as if they had paid
cash in a face-to-face transaction; in effect, the online transaction
could be even more anonymous than paying cash to a store clerk, since
there would be no visible connection between a purchaser and a
product.
3. The Data Market
To the extent that data subjects and online businesses bargain over
the rules for these three types of data transfers, online businesses
dominate the bargaining process. Typically, no bargaining occurs
between the business and the data subject over the value and use of
personal data.2 7 The data subject usually gives up private data at no
cost2 8 to the data collector, as through email or browsing activities.
Likewise, a data subject purchasing products over the Internet gives up
private information as part of the transaction through payment
mechanisms or simply by the products she purchases. Data collectors
are able to sell this information in the data market with no "royalty"
payment to the data subject.
So far, attempts to insure privacy in the data market have proved
unsuccessful because the self-regulatory model typically relies on
27 As Professor Jerry Kang argues, individual contracts between businesses and consumers
are not feasible because of prohibitively high transactions costs. See Kang, supra note 11.
28 Businesses may claim that the cost of the data is built in to the general transaction cost.
Such a claim would be difficult to refute without analysis of a particular business' pricing
models, although I am reasonably sure that such an analysis would reveal no "private data"
component. A secondary privacy data market would ensure accurate pricing of private data
by forcing businesses to openly bid for private data. For example, a company might offer a
10% discount in exchange for information on spending habits.
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contracts between data subjects and data recipient businesses. 29 Data
recipient businesses have little incentive to contract when they are
receiving valuable information at no cost or at a very low cost. The
data market also fails to protect privacy because data subjects are
typically unaware of data recipient use of private information,30 and
would incur and impose3' significant transaction costs in discovering
this information and crafting contracts with individual data
recipients.32 The data subject's inability to control the use of their data,
a result of data market inefficiencies, has brought calls for legislative
action.33 However, as Andrew Shapiro notes:
[I]n the current deregulatory climate, the Clinton Administration
and some privacy defenders are taking a different approach.
They're calling for the creation of a market for privacy to compete
with or complement the growing market for personal information.
(A report released in April by a presidential advisory panel, for
example, mentioned "the intriguing possibility that privacy could
29 "Model contracts" have been offered as a possible solution. See OECD Inventory,
supra note 2.
30 Surveys show that data subjects are concerned that their privacy may be compromised
through Internet transactions, but data recipients have little or no incentive to inform data
subjects of the exact use of their private data, so data subjects are generally unaware of the
extent of the data recipients' private information holdings, nor how the data recipients use this
information. As Joel Reidenberg stated, "a marketplace can only function efficiently if there
is transparency; citizens must be able to identify the collectors and users of their personal
information. However, for personal information, the natural tendency of the marketplace is to
obscure its treatment. This is a classic case of market failure." See Reidenberg, supra note
10, at 775.
31 Data subjects would also increase product and services costs by imposing transactional
costs on data subjects. Duncan MacDonald, a Citicorp executive, states that
Most companies, even in a highly competitive market such as consumer
financial services, must obtain and use certain data in relatively standard ways
in order to provide the requested services efficiently, and it would be wholly
impractical for such companies to collect and process data according to a large
number of variable protocols, depending on variations in particular contractual
arrangements reached with individual consumers.
Duncan A. MacDonald, Privacy, Self-Regulation, and the Contractual Model: A Report from
Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., available in National Telecomms. & Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Privacy and Self-regulation in the Information Age (1997)
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reportslprivacy/privacyrpt.htm >.
32 For a detailed argument, see Kang, supra note 11, at 1246-60.
33 See Kang, supra note 11; Reidenberg, supra note 10.
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emerge as a market commodity in the Information Age.") Just as
there is demand for consumer data among profiteers, so there is a
counterdemand on the part of individuals to keep that information
private.
3 4
Although data recipients are unlikely to develop a privacy market
voluntarily, new businesses specializing in data control may realize
the "intriguing possibility" of a privacy market.
B. The Privacy Escrow
The privacy market that I will describe requires a new
transactional framework that allows a data subject control over private
data throughout the transaction. A real property transfer framework,
the escrow system, offers a useful core structure on which to base a
consumer-oriented data control system. While the escrow system
serves as a property transfer framework, and may implicate property
theories inapplicable to the privacy market, we need only consider its
value as a transfer system and as a market facilitator. However,
although I limit the theoretical appropriation from the real property
escrow framework, I also note that the privacy escrow will perform a
much broader set of functions than the real property escrow. The
basic escrow framework will require various additions, pieced together
from other types of data protection services, in order to support the
varied functions of the privacy escrow. In the following sections, I
will introduce the concept of the privacy escrow, first by
distinguishing it from the real property escrow system, then by
elaborating on the additional functions or services that the privacy
escrow can offer online consumers.
34 Andrew L. Shapiro, Privacy for Sale: Peddling Data on the Internet (visited Nov. 23,
1999) <http://www.thenation.com/issue/970623/O623shap.htm>.
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1. Real Property Escrows to Privacy Escrows
A real property escrow is a neutral third party that performs
various functions to close a real estate transaction.3 5 The escrow
performs several functions, including securing the transaction by
ordering and delivering a commitment for title insurance to the parties,
ordering all necessary payoff statements and demands to clear the title,
and preparing all required documents to transfer title. The escrow
then receives all the necessary documents, funds, and signatures to
close the transaction, then records and delivers the documents and
transfers the funds.
Some important additions and modifications must augment the
core real property escrow framework in order to create a useful
privacy escrow framework. In this expanded framework, privacy
escrow agents36 will act as a buffer between data subjects and online
businesses. Rather than merely collecting and transferring data and
secured funds, a privacy escrow would (1) allow the customer to
browse through the online "store" anonymously; (2) provide
anonymous emailing; and (3) provide for anonymous transactions by
(a) collecting all information produced in a transaction; (b) stripping
away the private data; (c) securing the transaction; (d) sending only
the essential transactional information and necessary funds to the
original transacting business; and (e) arranging for anonymous
shipping (or practically anonymous, since the address would be
unavailable to online businesses, but not to the shipping company). In
35 See Professional Escrow Services, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions For Buyers, Sellers
and Refinances (visited Nov. 22, 1999)
<http://www.professionalescrow.com/cust/3040a.htm>.
36 Privacy escrow agents already exist in limited form. Some companies providing
"internet escrow services" are D & M Internet Escrow Service, Inc. ("assists buyers and
sellers in making secure transactions from internet sources"); i-Escrow, Inc. ("assists buyers
and sellers in establishing a safe, efficient, and secure transaction environment"); Internet
Clearing Corporation ("online escrow service that pays seller immediately upon verification
of shipment and guarantees buyer's complete satisfaction"); SecureTrades.Com ("an escrow
and merchandise holding service for individuals using auction and classifieds web sites"); and
TradeSafe ("escrow service specifically designed to make online buying, selling, and trading
safe and easy"). However, these businesses offer only a part of the services-assurance of
payment through a third party-that I believe to be necessary to establish a working market for
privacy. They make no claim as to anonymity.
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return for the service, a consumer would pay a privacy premium--a
small transaction cost--to the escrow agent.
2. Anonymizing Browsing and Email
Anonymous browsing already exists through Anonymizer, 37 a fee-
based service38 that allows clients to surf the web and send email
anonymously. Anonymizer is currently improving its service39
through European produced 128-Bit encryption software "distributed
from a country with no cryptography export restrictions. 4 °
Anonymizer, like Internet escrow services and anonymous cash
services I describe in the following section,4 1 offers an incomplete
37 See Anonymizer.com (visited Nov. 23, 1999)
<http:llwww.anonymizer.coml3.0/index.shtml>. Anonymizer offers various services,
including anonymous surfing, email, web publishing, and dial-up services.
38 Anonymizer's fee structure indicates that consumers are willing to pay fairly well for
privacy. While Anonymizer offers some browsing and email for "free", premium anonymous
surfing (which saves the user from Anonymizer advertising that pays for the free service)
costs $14.99 for three months of service, dial-up costs $59.95 for 3 months of service, and
anonymous web publishing goes for $29.99 for six months of service.
39 An Anonymizer advertisement touts its soon-to-be-released Anonymizer Pipeline
service:
Anonymizer Pipeline will protect your Internet activity with strong SSLeay
128-bit encryption between you and our network. It will allow you to use
email, news, and the Web anonymously and securely from your personal
computer. Your connection provider, and anyone on the network between you
and the Anonymizer subnetwork, will see only scrambled data. All your
activity will appear to come from the Anonymizer subnetwork in California.
Anonymizer Pipeline will also include a Surfing account for anonymous Web
browsing.
Anonymizer.com, Anonymizer Pipeline (visited Nov. 23, 1999)
<http://www.anonymizer.coml3.0/services/pipeline.shtml>.
40 Anonymizer states that "Pipeline is a European product distributed from a country with
no cryptography export restrictions, so you can download and use Pipeline legally from any
country without cryptography import restrictions. Apologies to our French customers-
complain to your government." Id. The Clinton Administration recently submitted a proposal
to relax encryption regulations, although the plan fell short of privacy groups expectations.
See Jeri Clausing, Administration Releases Draft of Encryption Export Rules, New York
Times on the Web (Nov. 23, 1999)
<http:llwww.nytimes.comllibrary/tech/99/1 l/cyber/articles/24code.html>.
41 See infra Part I.B.3.
460 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 445 (1999)
solution to private data transfer concerns. Anonymizer insures
anonymity while browsing or sending email, but does not insure
anonymity during online shopping, where data subjects transfer credit
card information to retailers. A comprehensive private data solution
must respond to all situations in which data transfers occur, combining
Anonymizer features with anonymous cash services and internet
escrow features to create an entirely anonymous transaction, with no
data transfers except to the privacy service provider and shippers. A
privacy escrow could provide such a service for a monthly fee to
clients who browse the Internet frequently, and wish to send email
anonymously. For clients who wish to use the service primarily for
online shopping, a per transaction fee structure may be more suitable.
3. Anonymizing Payment
The essential aspect of the privacy escrow service is the
opportunity for consumers to transact anonymously. A couple of
previous efforts to anonymize payment have been moderately
successful. One existing service, Mondex,42 allows consumers to pay
for products over the Internet using a smart card. Mondex offers some
privacy through its transactions, but cannot offer anonymity since
purchases are traceable by participating businesses and banks as the
Mondex account logs the client's last 300 purchases by card number,
price, and date.
43
Another electronic payment system, ECash,44 offers similar
privacy protections. Under the ECash system, a customer places order
at an online business' web site, and the online business transfers order
42 See Mondex on the Internet (visited Nov. 23, 1999)
<http://www.mondex.com/mondex/cgi-bin/printpage.pl?style--noframescash&fiiame=../docu
ments/net2.txt&doctype=genp> (claiming that "no-one need know who you are when using
Mondex. When goods and services are purchased using Mondex there is no record held of the
transaction, allowing the user the privacy normally only afforded with physical cash.").
43 See Privacy International, Privacy International's Mondex Complaint Is Upheld:
Electronic Cash Is Anything But Anonymous (visited Nov. 23, 1999)
<http://www.privacyinternational.orglissues/mondex/mondexrelease.html>. See also
Privacy International, Response from Fair Trading Office on Complaint (visited Nov. 23,
1999) <http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/mondex/mondex-response.html>.
44 See ECash.com (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http://www.ecash.com/ecashl.asp >.
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information to ECash over the Internet via a proprietary electronic
commerce messaging protocol (ECMP). ECash receives the order
information and routes a transaction authorization request to the
customer's card system (e.g., Visa). The card system then contacts the
customer's card-issuing bank and requests transaction authorization
from ECash. When ECash receives the transaction authorization, it
sends an ECMP message to the online business or distribution center
authorizing the order. The online business then sends ECash an
ECMP fulfillment notification, and ECash sends a settlement request
to the customer's bank. The customer's bank then transfers the money
to the business' bank account.
A privacy escrow system would operate in a transactionally similar
manner. Like Mondex or ECash, there will be a record of a debit (the
price of the product plus the service premium) and a credit to the
business' account, and the purchase could be traced to the consumer
only if a particular bank decided to share transaction records with a
particular business, 45 and could match up a product with a consumer
by price and date of purchase. However, the chances of the bank and
a business finding each other by mining through the transactions is
very remote. Also, the privacy escrow could make the task even more
difficult by transferring funds in blocks,46 a feature unavailable with
the Mondex and Ecash systems. While this may not be a significant
improvement over the Mondex and ECash systems, the ability to have
products shipped to your home, under your own name, is a crucial
distinction. With either Mondex or ECash, so long as a name and
address (or an email address, or an Internet Protocol address to a
server or station) must be supplied to have a purchase shipped to a
45 In Britain, the Mondex system benefits from banking regulations ensuring a bank's duty
of privacy toward a customers transaction information. In the U.S., consumers have some
protection under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994), which requires
banks to inform consumers of the circumstances in which automated bank account
information will be disclosed to third parties in ordinary business transactions.
46 A principal concern with anonymous payment systems is their potential use in money
laundering schemes. The short answer to this problem is that a balance must be struck
between law enforcement exigencies and privacy demands-essentially the same debate as
recent arguments over encryption. The longer answer addressing whether federal regulators
would require certain monitoring rights, and if so, to what extent, is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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customer, the business will be able to track the consumer. More
importantly, anonymous payment is of little use if the consumer gives
away his private data by browsing through the business' web site. A
privacy escrow could thus offer a higher degree of anonymity than
either Mondex or ECash.
Besides the anonymity that the privacy escrow enables, consumers
will also benefit because private information, again in control of the
data subject, will no longer be available to businesses at no cost.
Businesses looking to streamline marketing efforts4 7 would likely need
to offer incentives in the form of discounts or free products in order to
entice data subjects to give up personal information.48 Thus, a fringe
benefit of the creation of a privacy market is that it may also improve
a data subject's standing in the data market.
4. Securing Transactions
Although online businesses will lose whatever value they attach to
particular personal data, they too will receive a small benefit from a
privacy escrow-enabled transaction. Because the privacy escrow will
not forward any credits to the online business' account until they are
assured payment through a credit to their own account, the privacy
escrow insulates online businesses from all costs associated with failed
transactions (e.g., a person uses a check card for a transaction but has
insufficient funds or credit to consummate the purchase). To the
extent that failed transactions create additional processing costs for the
47 See supra note 20.
48 For those interested in knowing what price basic private information commands in
today's data market, visit <http://www.hugo.com/hugohomeflash/main.html>, where your
name, address, email, sex, and birthday entitle you to a free sample of "Dark Blue," Hugo
Boss' new cologne. While you may be able to get the sample at a perfume counter, you are
able to have the cologne sent to your house-your private data is at least worth the price of a
stamp, an envelope, and a few seconds of an employees time. Admittedly, individuals who
have already given up much of their data may not command a good price for any remaining
information, since businesses may already have a good profile of the consumer's tastes and
spending habits. However, so long as tastes, lifestyle, and spending habits change over time,
and competitors do not share data with one another, a data market will always exist for even
the most compromised consumers-at least, you may be able to get some free samples
delivered to your door.
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privacy escrow, the privacy escrow adds these costs to the price the
data subject pays for anonymous transactions.
5. A Model Privacy Escrow Transaction
To explain how the privacy escrow would facilitate secured
consumer transactions, I will describe a pair of fictitious purchases
through Amazon.com--one without a privacy escrow, and one
facilitated by a privacy escrow--focusing only on the private data
transferred to the retailer. Suppose that I decided to purchase
Professor Charles Whitebread's book, The Eight Secrets of Top Exam
Performance in Law School.49 Amazon.com requires me to furnish my
name, my mailing address, my telephone number, my email address,
and credit card information to complete the transaction. In addition,
Amazon.com has logged my searching and browsing activity,
recording my taste in books. When Amazon.com greets me at its main
page ("Season's greetings, rosegary@student.law.ucla.edu"), it knows
to target me as a buyer of books within a narrow category.5 0 Based on
49 CHARLES H. WmTEBREAD, THE EIGHT SECRETS OF TOP ExAM PERFORMANcE IN LAW
SCHOOL (1995).
5o I do not intend to portray all online profiling as inherently sinister. Many consumers do
not mind if a web site is targeted to their preferences, as e-retailers are quick to point out. Of
course, online businesses tend to exaggerate consumer acceptance of profiling. In one comic
exaggeration, a recent IBM E-business Solutions commercial, a test group of consumers sits
around a conference table complaining that businesses don't know them. One childless man
complains that he receives mailers for children's clothes, a woman complains that she receives
ads for auto insurance, even though she takes the subway rather than drives a car, and another
woman complains that she receives ads for aluminum siding from companies that do not
realize she lives in an apartment. The man complains to the marketing observers on the other
side of a one-way mirror, "You're the ones with all the computers and databases.... You don't
know who we are," as though he wished they did. During the commercial a "The King and I"
song accompanies the dialogue with the words "Getting to know you/Getting to know all
about you ...." Some isolated profiling is relatively benign, as when a single company uses
past purchases to determine what kind of toy a person might want to buy. In a more troubling
scenario, the information on toys is combined with data gathered from many other sites,
forming an uncomfortably detailed composite of the consumer. Amazon.com has a clever
way (among many) of determining customer preferences for targeted marketing. Consumers
may create a "wish list" for holiday gift-giving at Amazon .com, by browsing through their
various wares and selecting items that one would like to receive as a birthday present or as a
holiday gift. The customer is then asked to supply friends and relatives email addresses (as
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catalogued purchases made by others, Amazon.com is also able to
suggest other titles that may be of interest ("People who bought x also
bought y").
Now suppose that, based on my performance on my Federal
Income Tax final, I believe that Professor Whitebread's suggestions
were deficient and caused me to receive a lower grade than I deserved.
Returning to Amazon.com, I decide to buy Getting to Maybe: How to
Excel on Law School Exams,51 which I am sure will provide me with
the real exam secrets that Professor Whitebread refused to divulge.
This time, however, I will complete the transaction using a privacy
escrow agent. By using a privacy escrow agent, the transaction could
be anonymous. Under a privacy escrow system, I would pay a small
fee (say a few cents for a transaction,52 or, perhaps a monthly user
fee). I would have previously furnished the privacy escrow with all
necessary credit card information and shipping information. The
privacy escrow would agree to keep all information private and
inaccessible to third parties. The privacy escrow would assign me a
transaction code (for payment purposes) and a routing code (for
shipping purposes) for a transaction, with each transaction requiring a
new set of codes. By agreement, the privacy escrow would coordinate
the use of the transaction numbers with businesses, and would
coordinate use of the routing number with shippers.
53
I would log into Amazon.com though the escrow agent's site
(similar to logging on through the Anonymizer system) or through a
well as your own) so that they can receive the list, conveniently linked to Amazon.com to
facilitate purchases. When the customer returns to the site, Amazon is able to use the
information to peddle similar products (obviously hoping to fatten the wish list).
51 RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETrING TO MAYBE: How TO EXCEL ON
LAW SCHOOL EXAMS (1999).
52 The privacy escrow need not charge much to both effectively ensure privacy and turn a
healthy profit. The major investment will be in technology, not actual human monitoring of
online transactions.
53 With businesses, the privacy escrow would simply purchase products under its own
account after securing funds from the customer. The business would receive a routing number
from the privacy escrow, and would affix it to the product just as they would a mailing label.
The shipper, by agreement with the privacy escrow, would pick up the package and rout it to
the customer after receiving the code matching the routing number with the customer's
address (a process that would be accomplished through secured databases). The shipper
would be under contract, as would the privacy escrow, to maintain the secrecy of the routing
codes.
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software plug-in using an existing browser. No browsing activity
would be traceable to my account. As I "proceed to check-out"
(Amazon's term) with Getting to Maybe, I would type in the
transaction code and the routing code,54 and the privacy escrow would
then debit my account, including the privacy premium, and credit the
Amazon's account. Amazon would then receive a routing code from
the privacy escrow, and would ship the package through FedEx, UPS,
or another carrier. The carrier would receive shipping information
based on the routing code from the privacy escrow, and "Getting to
Maybe" would arrive at my door in time for my Corporate Finance
final. Amazon.com (or those companies that Amazon may share
information with) would retain no personal data as a result of the
transaction.
Having briefly outlined the functions of the privacy escrow, I now
move to the central question of how the privacy market and the
privacy escrow system address both EU privacy requirements and U.S.
policy preferences. In Part I, I will describe the EU Directive in more
detail, and will explain how the privacy escrow system exceeds the
requirements of the Directive. In Part III, I will describe the U.S. self-
regulatory regime, and how the privacy escrow system offers a market
response superior to the Safe Harbor Principles.
II. THE PRIVACY ESCROW SOLUTION SATISFIES EUROPEAN
UNION PRIVACY DEMANDS
A. The European Union Directive on Data Protection
The European Union responded to data protection concerns
through the development of an omnibus privacy policy. The European
54 Some technical magic, beyond my skills to create or describe, will be required to make it
through the data entry maze that consumers usually travel when purchasing online. While the
privacy escrow may use a system similar to the Mondex or ECash system for payment (except
that instead of using a single transaction number, the customer may enhance anonymity by
using a random transaction number linked to this account), the business must still be willing to
reconfigure their data input interfaces to accept routing numbers from the privacy escrow,
instead of full addresses.
466 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 445 (1999)
data protection policy model focuses on citizens' rights to
"information self-determination," 55 rather than on a more business-
oriented self-regulatory or market-based approach. The European
Union member states5 6 harmonized their various data protection
regulations through a five-year negotiation process, culminating in the
Directive, and scheduled implementation of the Directive over three
additional years. 57 The European Model has become the blueprint for
various national schemes to insure privacy protection.
58
Among the crucial features of the Directive are two provisions
requiring that personal data of European origin receive "adequate"
protection, be treated according to EU guidelines,59 and, if the data do
not receive adequate protection, that EU member states may prohibit
data exports to the outlaw country or outlaw businesses within the
country. U.S. companies, who are already heavily invested in the
data market and hope to avoid the exercise of these provisions by EU
member states, have expressed concern over the EU "adequacy"
standard, inquiring as to how they are to satisfy the standard. The U.S.
55 Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 782 n.53. Reidenberg reports that the term "information
self-determination" was coined by a German court in 1983, when it prohibited the
"intrusiveness of a national census." Id. See Judgment of the First Senate [Bverfge,
Karslruhe], Dec. 15 1983, translated in 5 HuM. RTS. L.J. 94 (1984).
56 The EU member states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the U.K.
57 The implementation process has encountered difficulties, as the European Commission
decided to send reasoned opinions to nine member states for failure to notify all the measures
necessary to implement the Directive. If the Member Sates do not offer a satisfactory
response to the opinions, the Commission may decide to refer the cases to the European Court
of Justice. See The European Union Web Site, Data Protection: Commission Decides to Send
Reasoned Opinions to Nine Member States (visited Sept. 26, 1999)
<http://europa.eu.int/rapid/startcgi/guesten.ksh?paction.gttext+gt&doc+IP/99/592101RAPID
&lg=EN>.
58 See Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 786.
59 See Directive, supra note 1, art. 4 (dealing with choice of laws), art. 25 (covering export
prohibitions). To determine whether data protection is adequate, EU member state privacy
commissioners are to take particular account of "the nature of the data, the conditions of a
specific planned transfer, and the type of protection offered by both the legal order and the
relevant business practices in the receiving nation." Schwartz, supra note 5, at 485 (1995);
see also Directive, supra note 1, art. 25(2).
60 The U.S. might successfully challenge this provision under the WTO. See PETER SWIRE
& ROBERT LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BusINEss: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONiC COMMERCE,
AND THE EUROPEm DIRECTIV 188-96 (1998).
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Department of Commerce has responded by producing the Safe
Harbor Principles61 in consultation with some of these businesses, the
Principles serving as a guide to U.S. companies seeking to comply
with the Directive.
B. The Privacy Market Response
The European imperative, though concerned primarily with rights
rather than market interests, is not necessarily at odds with a market
response. However, a self-regulatory response, like the Safe Harbor
provisions, will take some time to implement. Furthermore, even if
the Safe Harbor Principles satisfy the EU, they may not satisfy some
EU Member State citizens, who may prefer a higher level of data
protection. The privacy market offers many advantages to the EU and
its member states' citizens that address these concerns.
First, the privacy market solution, a privacy escrow service, would
immediately satisfy the European informational rights imperative. A
privacy escrow allows the data subject to control her own data by
completely limiting data transfer to U.S. companies, regardless of
whether these companies offer adequate data protection under
Directive standards.
Second, Europeans could enjoy more data control under the
privacy escrow system than they receive under the consumer-friendly
European Directive. The privacy escrow allows a consumer to
essentially shut off the flow of all personal data, except to the privacy
escrow itself. Instead of offering data security, the privacy escrow
offers transactional anonymity.62
Third, privacy escrows may operate as European business entities,
thereby keeping all private data within European borders. Using a
European privacy escrow obviates concerns over potential trade
disputes related to the enforcement of data export prohibitions.
61 See infra Part III.
62 The EU hopes to give consumers the opportunity for anonymous Internet transactions.
See European Commission, Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data, Anonymity on the Internet, XV D /5022/97 Final (1997).
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Fourth, because a small number of privacy escrow services could
serve as the conduits for all Internet transactions, the member state
Privacy Commissioners, who enforce the Directive provisions, could
easily monitor proper data handling.63 Privacy Commissioners could
develop an effective regulatory relationship with a few common
privacy escrows, eliminating much of the economically wasteful
bureaucracy needed to monitor and enforce Directive compliance
among thousands of businesses across the member states and in
foreign countries. Easy enforcement is crucial to insure that the
anonymity of Internet transactions does not compromise public policy
initiatives against illegal content, copyright infringement, and financial
fraud. 64 Clearly, the integrity of the privacy escrow service requires
specific contractual provisions that prohibit the use of the service for
these purposes. If the client uses the services for these purposes, the
privacy escrow's contractual duty to maintain client anonymity would
dissolve.
Finally, the privacy escrow system addresses some fundamental
weaknesses in the European Union regulatory scheme itself. One
regulatory concern is that the Directive requires equivalent protection
within the European Union, but merely adequate protection outside the
European Union. A European scholar, Peter Dippoldsmann, has noted
that this protection discrepancy produces higher risk for EU Member
State citizens since they are less likely to know how their data will be
used outside the EU than in other EU member states. 65 A privacy
escrow system, on the other hand, assures its clients a common
standard of protection.
Also, third nations and online businesses may undermine the EU's
data control capabilities by the creation of a "'data haven'--the
63 According to Michael Froomkin,
[d]ata protection laws are likely to work best when the data collectors are few,
or operate in industries that are already highly regulated, such as banks. Bigger
databases are easier to regulate than many small databases: the more
concentrated the profile data, the greater the privacy that is possible by
regulation.
Froomkin, supra note 17, at 490-91 (citations omitted).
6 See id at 5.
65 Peter Dippoldsmann, Europaische Union und Datenschultz, 27 KRxsTIc-E Jusnz 369,
377 (1994).
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information equivalent of a tax haven--a single nation that offered to
warehouse offshore data."66 Although a good deal of European
personal information may have escaped European borders, EU
Member State citizens could impede the creation or enhancement of
the data haven by cutting off data flows through the services of a
privacy escrow.
Mi. THE PRIVACY ESCROW SYSTEM SATISFIES U.S. MARKET
PREFERENCES
A. Self-Regulation
The U.S. position on privacy and information regulation has been
to rely on market discipline to enforce adequate privacy standards,
rather than to legislate a comprehensive set of privacy standards.67 The
Clinton Administration has stated that it will defer to industry self-
regulation so long as the industry moves toward "effective privacy
protection." 68 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regards self-
regulation as "the least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure
fair information practices, given the rapidly evolving nature of the
Internet and computer technology."
69
Self-regulation has had limited success. Online businesses are
now providing more notice of their data practices than they were in
1998, and several "significant and promising self-regulatory
privacy seal programs, such as TRUSTe and BBBOnLine,72 are now
6 Froomkin, supra note 17, at 491; see also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 484.
67 However, Commerce Secretary William Daley recently warned online businesses to
self-regulate or risk government intervention. See Brad Wright, Commerce Chief Issues
Privacy Warning for Web Firms, CNN.com (Nov. 9, 1999)
<http://cnn.com/TECH/computing/9 911/09/online.profiling/index.html>.
68 See Framework, supra note 7, at 14 ("We believe that private efforts of industry working
in cooperation with consumer groups are preferable to government regulation, but if effective
privacy protection cannot be provided in this way, we will reevaluate this policy.").
69 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 6 (1999) [hereinafter SELF-REGULATION].
70 Id.
71 The TRUSTe program "requires participants to post an online privacy policy that meets
TRUSTe guidelines, to submit to TRUSTe oversight, and to cooperate with TRUSTe's
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underway. Nevertheless, "despite the laudable efforts of industry
leaders," 73 several recent assessments 74 show that the majority of web
sites have not implemented the basic FTC information practices of
Notice/Awareness, Choice/Consent, Access/Participation, and
Security/Integrity.
75
Because the self-regulatory scheme depends on fair dealing by
online businesses who generally enjoy valuable leverage against
consumers in the data market, privacy enthusiasts and consumer
groups suspect that self-regulation will never live up to its promises.
The privacy market, on the other hand, does not depend on self-
dispute resolution efforts. In return, participants are given the right to display TRUSTe's seal
on their home page." Online Privacy Alliance, OPA White Paper: Online Consumer Data
Privacy in the United States, at 20 (Nov. 19, 1998). OPA is an industry coalition of global
corporations "concerned with protecting the privacy of individuals online." Id at 1.
72 BBBOnLine is a subsidiary of the Better Business Bureau, and offers a privacy seal
program similar to the TRUSTe program.
73 SELF-REGULATION, supra note 69, at 6.
74 As Joel Reidenberg discusses, there are several challenges to the development of
comprehensive U.S. privacy laws. One challenge is that no existing U.S. agency or
department is suited to act as a "consensus builder, privacy arbitrator, and international
advocate." Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 790. Reidenberg suggests the creation of an
independent privacy commission. See id at 791. Two 1999 studies indicate the current extent
of self-regulation practices. The first study, the Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey,
lists findings from 361 of the busiest web sites on the World Wide Web. The second study,
conducted by the Online Privacy Alliance, surveyed the top 100 World Wide Web sites. The
graph below, produced by the Federal Trade Commission, reports the results:
GIPPS Report OPA Study
Number of sites in sample 361 100
Number of sites collecting personal information 337 99
Percent of sites in sample collecting personal 93% 99%
information
Number of sites posting any privacy disclosure 238 93
Percent of sites in sample posting any privacy disclosure 66% 93%
Number of sites posting a privacy policy notice 157 81
Percent of sites in sample posting a privacy policy notice 44% 81%
Number of sites posting a disclosure for all four FTC 36 22
substantive fair information practice principles
Percent of sites in sample posting a disclosure for all 10% 22%
four FTC substantive fair information practice principles
75 See Privacy Online, supra note 3, at 7-11.
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regulation and fair dealing by data marketers--the data subject controls
the data transfers herself.
B. The Safe Harbor Principles
Because of electronic commerce pressures76 and political pressures
developing since the creation of the Directive, U.S. companies do not
enjoy the luxury of a slowly developing self-regulatory system such as
they currently enjoy in the domestic market. As noted, the
Department of Commerce, in consultation with many of the largest
data market players, has been working on the International Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles77 in order to speed the development of the
self-regulatory regime and to alleviate U.S. business concerns over the
EU Directive on Data Protection. The Safe Harbor Principles "are
intended for use solely by U.S. organizations receiving personal data
from the European Union78 for the purpose of qualifying for the safe
76 The EU has allowed data transfers to continue while the U.S. and the EU negotiate the
Safe Harbor Principles. However, U.S. companies risk losing market share to companies in
countries that offer adequate and dependable data protection. European consumers, like U.S.
consumers, will likely be unwilling to shop through a company that sells their personal data
when they can purchase an equivalent product from a company that does not. And, if no other
equivalent products are available online, an individual may decline to purchase the product, or
decide to purchase through conventional means via local dealers.
77 See supra note 8.
78 See Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 8. In other words, U.S. consumers would not
receive privacy protections offered under the Safe Harbor Principles. In a March 1999
address before Information Technology Association of America, Under Secretary of
Commerce David Aaron said that "[i]n no way does the U.S. government intend for these safe
harbor principles to be seen as precedents for any future changes in the U.S. privacy regime.
Indeed, some of these principles might not be appropriate in a strictly American context."
David L. Aaron, Remarks before the Information Technology Assoc. of America Fourth
Annaual I.T. Policy Summit (March 15, 1999), available at
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/Itaapr3l599.htm> (visited Apr. 9, 2000). When the DOC
solicited comments on the Safe Harbor Principles, consumers uniformly expressing
displeasure with the limitation of the Safe Harbor Principles to EU citizens. A sampling of
comments: "It is appalling to me that in the United States of America, land of freedom and
supposed world leader in the promotion of democracy, the concerns of the citizen are
subordinated to the fleeting and socially irresponsible commercialism of American
businesses.... The U.S. should be embracing the standard of individual right to privacy set by
such countries as those of the EU and others" [Derck Birdwell]; "I support the European, and
now, Canadian, position that protects individuals' privacy on the Internet. While businesses
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harbor and the presumption of 'adequacy' it creates." 79 The basic
elements of the Safe Harbor Principles reflect OECD guidelines:
notice; choice; onward transfer (disclosure to third parties must be
consistent with notice and choice); security of data; data integrity; data
subject access to their data; and enforcement mechanisms for ensuring
compliance with the principles. Despite a superficial categorical
similarity to the OECD guidelines, however, a number of groups have
criticized the Safe Harbor Principles for their lack of substantive
privacy protection.80 The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD),
an international consumer group, urged the European Commissioners
and the Ministers of the European Council to reject the Safe Harbor
proposal, since they find that the proposal "lacks an effective means of
enforcement and redress for privacy violations[,] places unreasonable
burdens on consumers and unfairly requires European citizens to
sacrifice their legal right to pursue privacy complaints through their
national authorities."
81
The most recent draft of the Safe Harbor Principles mentions only
a couple of substantial remaining disagreements between the U.S. and
the European Union. The European Union does not agree with the
"choice" principle as outlined in the Safe Harbor proposal, since they
believe the formulation offers data subjects "substantially less control
may complain that they should be allowed to regulate themselves--I say 'hogwashl' Just
consider a moment how conscientiously businesses regulate themselves when it comes to the
almighty dollar-about as much as a hog regulates its feeding at the feeding trough!" [Luca
Lepori]; "I wish to state that I am strongly opposed to the policy that depends on industry self-
regulation and that gives U.S. consumers less protection than European consumers. If you
really believe that industry will self-regulate adequately, I have a bridge to sell you. And if
you continue to promote the Safe Harbor policy, I have to assume that my tax-payer dollars
are going straight into the pockets of industry, to my detriment. And, that your role of
protecting consumers is being abdicated." [Cathleen Caffrey]. Comments on Safe Harbor
Received From Individuals (visited on Apr. 9, 2000)
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecomL/599comments.htm>.
79 Id.
so The European Union also criticized the preliminary Safe Harbor proposal. See Working
Party of the European Data Protection Supervisory Authorities, Transfers of Personal Data to
Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive, DG XV
D/5025/98/WP12 (July 24, 1998)
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wpl2en.htm>.
81 Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, Recommendations on Electronic Commerce (visited
Sept. 30, 1999) <http:www.tacd.org/meeting2/electronic.html>.
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of their data in comparison to the situation in Europe. '82 The second
disagreement concerns the treatment of sensitive data. The Safe
Harbor Principles state that:
For sensitive information, (i.e. personal information specifying
medical or health conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership
or information specifying the sex life of the individual) [data
subjects must be given affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice if the
information is to be used for a purpose other than those for which it
was originally collected or disclosed to any type of third party other
than those already notified to the individual, or used or disclosed in
a manner other than as subsequentl 3 authorized by the individual
through the exercise of opt in choice.
The European Union wishes to change the word "specifying" in
the first line of the paragraph to "revealing." The Commerce
Department and the businesses it represents believe that the word
"revealing" "is not clear enough, because it allows so much in the way
of inference."
8 4
C. The Privacy Market Solution
The Safe Harbor Principles represent a small step toward a
workable data protection scheme. However, because the Safe Harbor
Principles rely on self-regulation among thousands of businesses, they
do not represent a comprehensive, consumer-controlled or even
especially consumer-involved solution to privacy concerns, and likely
will not and cannot warrant the same level of consumer confidence as
consumers would enjoy with a privacy escrow.
The privacy escrow system satisfies U.S. preferences in three
ways. First, the Clinton Administration and the U.S. Department of
Commerce would be satisfied that market forces, rather than omnibus
82 See Dep't of Commerce, International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles n.2 (visited Apr.
9, 2000) <http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/ecom/Principlesl 199.htm> (draft of Nov. 15, 1999).
83 id.
84 Idat n.3.
4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 445 (1999)
legislation, achieved a satisfactory privacy solution. Online
businesses, the losers in the privacy market (to the extent that private
data is no longer free), will have no standing to complain about the
privacy solution. After all, these businesses have not publicly
expressed concern over their own profits from data collection--they
simply argued that market forces should determine the future of data
privacy. Although the privacy market is not their anticipated solution
to privacy concerns, it nevertheless responds to the basic market
imperative demanded by U.S. government and industry, without
sacrificing basic privacy imperatives demanded by consumers and the
European Union.
Second, as noted above, because the privacy escrows could operate
out of an EU member state, European consumers could enjoy access to
U.S. online business without concern over whether the particular
business adhered to the Safe Harbor Principles. The privacy escrow
solution thus allows the continued development of transatlantic online
markets without requiring reluctant European consumers to trust U.S.
businesses' use of their private data. Since European customers may
have the opportunity to deal with a local privacy escrow, they need not
even send their private information across their own borders.
Finally, the privacy escrow system also offers U.S. consumers the
same protection as their European counterparts. U.S. consumers, like
European consumers, need not worry about whether Amazon, Disney,
or Microsoft will abide by the Safe Harbor provisions. The privacy
market response offers is not simply a market response to the
difficulties posed by EU/U.S. data protection differences, but is a
solution to privacy concerns between any data subject and any data
recipient."
85 Note, however, that some personal data must be collected for certain transactions (e.g.,
insurance policies). The privacy escrow will be of limited value in these situations.
Consumers may need to rely on model contracts with data collectors in these rare instances.
These data transfers typically include explicit contractual agreements, and thus the
incorporation of a model contract in these instances would not burden the transaction.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The creation of a privacy market through the privacy escrow
system represents an immediately workable solution to EU/U.S.
differences on privacy and data protection. The privacy escrow
system would allow consumers to transact with online businesses
anonymously, whether through email, browsing, or purchases. The
ability to transact anonymously exceeds any self-regulatory scheme
currently in development, including the Safe Harbor Principles, and
easily satisfies the demands of the European Union Directive on Data
Protection. Also, because a privacy escrow system does not require
legislative intervention, but represents an entirely industry-generated
solution to the problems of data transfers, it satisfies the U.S.
preference for a market response.
As U.S. data marketers frequently mention, electronic commerce
can only flourish if allowed to develop without restraining legislation.
As privacy enthusiasts counter, the development of e-commerce is
presently hampered by public fear over the uses of private data
transferred through online transactions. The privacy escrow solution
responds to both concerns, offering a market response that fosters
consumer confidence in electronic commerce.

